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PROPOSED FEDERAL REGULATION
OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS BY MOTOR VEHICLE'
By KARL STECHER*
T E rise of the motor vehicle from the experimental state to
its present commanding position in the field of transporta-
tion has occurred within the compass of the present generation.
,Its growth and development have revolutionized the transporta-
tion situation and made antiquated many of the theories upon
which the regulation of transportation agencies has been based.
The fact that the change has occurred within such a compara-
tively few years has resulted in the failure of a great part of the
national legislation (and lack of legislation) to take cognizance
of present-day facts. The first important case dealing with motor
vehicle regulation to be decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States was that of Hendrick -z,. Maryland2 in 1914. Trans-
portation by motor vehicle was then in its infancy. With the
statement that:
"In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a
state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for
the public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its
highways of all motor vehicles,-those moving in interstate com-
merce as well as others."3
and
. ..where a state at its own expense furnishes special fa-
* Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law, Macon, Georgia;
attorney for the Interstate Commerce Commission. 1925-1928.
'This does not purport to be a detailed analysis of the decisions on the
subject of motor vehicle regulation. Cases are referred to only in so far
as they throw light on the necessity for federal regulation.
2(1914) 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385.
3(1914) 235 U. S. 610, 622, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385.
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cilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as
well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor."'
and with no clear limitation upon the power of the states to act
in the absence of legislation by Congress. the regulation of motor
vehicles proceeded in a relatively quiet and orderly manner. The
corner-stone of all regulation of common carrier operations by
motor vehicle was laid in the requirement of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. In general, the states simply applied
the same regulations to interstate carriers that were applied to
those operating wholly intrastate. They required a certificate for
interstate as well as intrastate carriers.5
In 1925, however, the situation changed completely as a result
of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Buck v. Kiiykendall.' Buck, a citizen of Washington, was
denied a certificate to operate an auto stage between Seattle, Wash-
ington, and Portland, Oregon, as a common carrier for hire, on
the ground that the territory was already adequately served.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, after pointing out some of tile types
of state regulation of interstate commerce which may be sustained
under the police power, stated:
" . .. The provision here in question is of a differeut charac-
ter. Its primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety
or to conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of compe-
tition. It determines not the manner of use, but the persons b)
whom the highways may be used. . . .Thus, the provision of
the ,Washington statute is a regulation, not of the use of its own
highways, but of interstate commerce. Its effect upon such com-
merce is not merely to burden but to obstruct it. Such state ac-
tion is forbidden by the commerce clause. It also defeats the
purpose of Congress expressed in the legislation giving federal
aid 7 for the construction of interstate highways."8
4(1914) 235 iU. S. 610, 623-24, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385.5See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Schoenfeldt, (1923) 123 Wash. 579,
213 Pac. 26; State v. Department of Public Works, (1923) 123 Wash. 705,
213 Pac. 31; and Interstate Motor Transit Co. v. Kuykendall, (D.C. Wash.
1922) 284 Fed. 882, holding a state could require an interstate motor car-
rier to procure a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
state.
6(1925) 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623. 38 A. L. R. 286.7The part of the Pacific Highway which lies within the state of Wash-
ington was built by it with federal aid. Buck v. Kuykendall. (1925) 267
U. S. 307, 314, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623, 38 A. L. R. 286. It seems
that the federal aid legislation was not a material factor in influencing the
decision of the court, however, for on the same (lay it arrived at the same
conclusion in Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, (1925) 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sti,. Ct.
327, 69 L. Ed. 627, a similar case in which the question of federal aid was
not involved.
8(1925) 267 U. S. 307. 315-316, 45 Sup. Ct. 324. 69 L. Ed. 623. See
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The result of this decision was to leave interstate motor car-
riers free from all regulation other than of a purely police nature,
while the competing rail carriers were subject to the most strin-
gent regulation.
Almost immediately interstate motor vehicle operations sprang
up all over the country? That some regulation was necessary,
both in the interest of the responsible operators and for the pro-
tection of the public, was evident.
During the following session of Congress a bill to regulate car-
riers of persons and of property by motor vehicle in interstate
commerce was introduced in the House by Representative Parker,
Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce.'
0
The administration of the act was to be placed in the state com-
missions or boards, acting either singly or jointly as the case
might require, with the right of appeal to the Interstate Commerce
Commission." A certificate of public convenience was required,
application for which was to be made to the state commission or
commissions. Provision was made for protection of passengers
and the general public through the requirement of a suitable bond,
policy of insurance, or proof of financial responsibility.
The bill was modeled along lines somewhat similar to the usual
state statute covering the subject. It failed to pass Congress.
An extensive investigation into the subject of motor bus and
motor truck transportation and its relation to transportation sub-
ject to its jurisdiction was entered into by the commission on June
15, 1926. In its report issued April 10, 1928,12 it followed broadly
the provisions of the bill introduced by Representative Parker, ex-
cept for the very important recommendation that the regulation
should be limited to carriers of persons. Shortly before the issu-
ance of this report a bill following its recommendations generally
was introduced in Congress, but it was never enacted."
also Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, (1925) 266 U. S. 570,
45 Sup. Ct. 191, 69 L. Ed. 445, 36 A. L. R. 1105.9See Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, (1928) 140 I. C. C.
685, 697.
1OH. R. 8266, 69th Congress, 1st Session. On December 6, 1927. Sena-
tor Watson introduced S. 1252 (70th Congress, 1st Session) in the Senate.
It was substantially the same as H. R. 8266.
"Referred to hereinafter as the commission.
12(1928) 140 I. C. C. 685.
"3H. R. 12380, 70th Congress, Ist Session, introduced March 24, 1928.
Senntor Watson introduced in the Senate S. 3992 (70th Congress, Ist Ses-
sion). This was the same as H. R. 12380.
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Sprout v. South Bend. The city of South Bend, Indiana enacted
an ordinance requiring everyone using the streets or highways of
the city for the indiscriminate solicitation of passengers for trans-
portation into or out of the city to pay a license fee and to obtain
a contract of liability insurance.
Sprout operated a 12-passenger bus between South Bend, Indi-
ana, and Niles, Michigan. While he would stop to discharge passen-
gers before reaching the state line, he always insisted that they pay
transportation to some point in Michigan.
In an action brought by the City of South Bend against Sprout"
the supreme court of Indiana held that neither the requirement
of an indemnity bond nor a license as a condition precedent to
doing business in the city streets violated the federal constitution.
The case was carried on writ of error to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and was decided on May 14, 1928.' Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis, delivering the opinion of the court, stated:
(1) "The legal character of this suburban bus traffic was not
affected by the device of requiring the payment of a fare fixed
for some Michigan point, or by Sprout professing that he sought
only passengers destined to that state. The actual facts govern.
For this purpose, the destination intended by the passenger when
he begins his journey, and known by the carrier, determines the
character of the commerce."' 6
(2) "In the absence of federal legislation covering the subject,
the state1 7 may require licensing or registration of busses used in
interstate commerce; but the license fee nmust be no larger in
amount than is reasonably required to defray the expense of ad-
ministering the regulations."' 8
(3) "A state may impose, even on motor vehicles engaged ex-
clusively in interstate commerce, a reasonable charge as their fair
contribution to the cost of constructing and maintaining the pub-
lic highways. . . . .
14(1926) 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504, 154 N. E. 309, 49 A. I.. R. 1198.
15Sprout v. City of South Bend, Ind., (1928) 277 U. S. 163, 48 Sup.
Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L. R. 45.
16(1928) 277 U. S. 163, 168, 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. .. R.
45. See also Inter-City Coach Co. v. Atwood, (D.C.R.I. 20, 1927) 21 F.
(2d) 83.1 71t was pointed out that the state might delegate the power to a
municipality.
18" . . . But it does not appear that the license fee here in question
was imposed as an incident of such a scheme of municipal regulation: nor
that the proceeds were applied to defray the expenses of such regulation:
nor that the amount collected under the ordinance was no more than was
reasonably required for such a purpose. It follows that the exaction of the
license fee can not be sustained as a police measure..... " (1928) 277
U. S. 163. 169-70. 48 Sup. Ct. 502. 72 L. Ed. 833. 62 A. L. R. 45.
19(1928) 277 U. S. 163. 170. 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833. 62 A. L. R.
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(4) "A state may . . . require payment of an occupation tax
from one engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce
"20
But it may do so only if it is imposed solely on account of the
intrastate business; the amount is not increased because of the
interstate business done; and the person taxed could discontinue
the intrastate business without withdrawing also from the inter-
state business.
(5) A state may require operators of interstate busses to pro-
vide adequate insurance for the payment of judgments recovered
against them, "if limited to damages suffered within the state by
persons other than the passenger.1
21
While the effect of this decision was to clarify the situation
somewhat, it tended to contract rather than to expand the power
of the states.
Bills applicable to carriers of persons only have been introduced
at each succeeding session of Congress. 22 The trend in these bills
has been toward greater centralization of control in the commission
45. See also Clark v. Poor, (1927) 274 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 702, 71 L.
Ed. 1199; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, (1928) 276 U. S. 245,
48 Sup. Ct. 230, 72 L. Ed. 551; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook (1930) 281
U. S. 66, 50 Sup. Ct. 204, 74 L. Ed. 704; Interstate Transit v. Lindsey,
(1931) 283 U. S. 183, 51 Sup. Ct. 380, 75 L. Ed. 953; Red Ball Transit Co.
v. Marshall, (D.C. Ohio 1925) 8 F. (2d) 635; American Transit Co. v.
Philadelphia, (D.C. Pa. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 991; Sanger v. Lukens, (D.C.
Idaho 1927) 24 F. (2d) 226; American Motor Coach System Y. Philadel-
phia, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 736; Atlantic-Pacific Stages v.
Stahl, (D.C. Mo. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 260; Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines
v. Perry, (D.C. Ga. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 900; Alkazin v. Wells, (D.C. Fla.
1931) 47 F. (2d) 904; Prouty v. Coyne, (D.C. So. Dak. 1932) 55 F. (2d)
289; Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, (D.C. Kan. 1931) 55 F. (2d)
347, upholding the imposition by a state of a mileage tax on interstate
operators.
But it was not found that any part of the license fee here in question
had been prescribed for that purpose; so its exaction could not be sustained
either as an inspection fee or as an excise for the use of the streets of the
city.
20(1928) 277 U. S. 163, 170-171, 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62
A. L. R. 45.
21(1928) 277 U. S. 163, 171-172, 48 Sup. Ct. 502. 72 L Ed. 833. 62
A. L. R. 45. See Williams v. Denny, (1929) 151 Wash. 630. 276 Pac. 858.
On February 19, 1929, Representative Huddleston introduced H. R. 17189
(70th Congress, 2d Session) "To protect the right of recovery for damage
in connection with the operation for hire of passenger motor vehicles in
interstate and foreign commerce," but it failed of passage. He also intro-
duced the same bill in the next Congaress, as H. R. 7630 (71st Congress.
2d Session). Representative Hoch likewise introduced it as H. R. 7699
(71st Congress. 2d Session). Neither bill passed.
2
2H. R. 15621, 70th Congress. 2d Session, introduced December 20. 1928.
S. 1351, 71st Congress, 1st Session, introduced June 4. 1929. Substan-
tially the same as H. R. 15621.
H. R. 3822, 71st Congress, 1st Session, introduced June 10, 1929. Sub-
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and toward granting it powers analogous to those it now possesses
over rail carriers.
THE PRESENT SITUATION
\Vhile more than seven years have elapsed since the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Buck v. Kuykelnlall,2  Congress
has up to the present time enacted no legislation. Bills have been
pending continuously since the beginning of 1926.24 \WVhile no
one of them would have offered an adequate solution of the prob-
lem of motor vehicle regulation, any one of the bills mentioned
would have been a start in the right direction and would have
been better than no regulation at all.
At the present time bills are pending in each house of Congress.
S. 2793. Senator Couzens, Chairman of the Committee on In-
terstate Commerce, introduced the pending Senate bill on Janu-
ary 7, 1932..21 It begins in the usual manner, and provides for
the regulation of both the "common carrier by motor vehicle"-"
and the "charter carrier by motor vehicle."-7
The commission is given power over qualifications of employees,
safety, and equipment of all common and charter carriers: ac-
counts of all common carriers; and service and rates of common
stantially the same as H. R. 15621.
H. R. 7954, 71st Congress, 2d Session, introduced January 6, 1930. Sub-
stantially the same as H. R. 15621.
H. R. 10202, 71st Congress, 2d Session, introduced February 22, 1930.
Similar to its predecessors but centering more authority in the conmmission.
H. R. 10288, 71st Congress, 2d Session, passed the House March 24,
1930. Similar to H. R. 10202.
23(1925) 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623, 38 A. L. R. 286.
24 H. R. 8266 was introduced January 23, 1926. See supra note 10.
25S. 2793, 72d Congress, 1st Session, "To regulate the transportation of
persons and property in interstate and foreign commerce by motor carriers
operating on the public highways," to be cited as the "Federal Motor Car-
rier Act, 1932."
For convenience S. 2793 will be referred to hereinafter as the Senate
bill.
26
"The term 'common carrier by motor vehicle' includes any common
carrier of persons and any common carrier of property operating motor
vehicles for compensation in interstate or foreign commerce over fixed
routes or between fixed termini." Sec. 1(a) (10).
School busses, taxicabs, hotel busses, and some vehicles used by the
Secretary of the Interior are excluded. Sec. l(b).
7
"The term 'charter carrier by motor vehicle' includes any carrier of
persons and any carrier of property operating motor vehicles for compen-
sation in interstate or foreign commerce other than those included in para-
graph (a) (10) and in subdivision (b) of this section." Sec. 1(a) (II).
For a discussion of legal problems involved in regulation of chart-r
carriers see Coordination of Motor Transportation, (1932) 182 1. C. C.
263, 381-382.
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carriers of persons.28 The matter of safety of operation in gone
into in detail.
29
The procedure with respect to the handling of complaints is
much the same as under the Interstate Commerce Act." In prac-
tically all material matters," however, the functions of the ex-
aminer either must or may be exercised by a joint board, com-
posed of men from the interested states.3" The appointment of
such a board is mandatory when three or less states are involved,
and optional when the number is greater.
-sCoinoy carriers of persons: "continuous and adequate service at
just and reasonable rates, a uniform system of accounts and reports, quali-
fications, and maximum hours of service of employees, safety of operation
and equipment" (size of equipment), comfort of passengers, and pick-up
and delivery points. Sec. 2(a).
Common carriers of property: "a uniform system of accounts and re-
ports, qualifications, and maximum hours of service of employees, and
safety of operation and equipment" (size of equipment). No power is
given over rates. Sec. 2(a) (2).
Charter carriers: "qualifications and maximum hours of service of em-
ployees, safety of operation and equipment" (size of equipment) and com-
fort of passengers. Sec. 2(a)(3).29 No operator of any motor vehicle is to be permitted to remain on
duty for a longer period than eight consecutive hours, and he shall not be
called for duty again until he has had eight hours rest, suitable provision
being made for emergencies. Sec. 2(b) (1). Motor vehicles with a capacity
of more than twenty passengers must have at least two operators on duty.
Sec. 2(b) (2).
On December 8, 1931, Representative McClintic introduced H. R. 221
(72d Congress, 1st Session) providing: "That the legislature of each state
shall have the right to regulate the size, speed, and license fee of all intra-
state and interstate busses or trucks engaged in public business with its
citizens."
3 OFinal orders entered under this act are subject to the same court re-
view as orders of the commission made under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Sec. 3 (h).
Provision is made for service of notices and process, for fines, and for
redress by injunction or otherwise. Sec. 12.31Applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity: the
suspension, change or revocation of such certificates: consolidations, mer-
gers, acquisitions of control; rates, fares, and charges: approval of surety
bonds, policies of insurance, or other securities for the protection of the
public. Sec. 3(d).32 Members of joint boards are to be chosen as follows: First. the state
commission may choose a member. If there is no such commission, or it
fails to make an appointment, then the governor of the state shall do so.
The commission is nuthorized to appoint such choice on the board. The
joint board shall be "composed solely of one member from each state within
which the motor-carrier operations involved in the matter referred are or
are Proposed to be conducted, unless it is necessary for the commission to
apooint one of its own members or examiners in order to avoid a joint
board with an even number of members." In cases in which tle states fail
or refuse to appoint members of a board, or in which the members can not
aeree, the commission is free to decide the issue the same as in a case in
which no board is Provided for. The ioint board shall be an agency of the
federal government while so acting, and the members shall receive expenses
but no salary. See Sec. 3.
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This plan33 of having joint boards exercise the functions of the
examiner seems open to grave question. If there is no unanimity
on the part of the members of the board, a state whose represen-
tative is in the minority will feel that its rights have been disre-
garded. If, on the other hand, the commission on appeal should
decide in favor of the minority, the dissatisfaction would be even
greater. Is this not in reality merely an idle show of giving to the
states something which they in fact will not have? It certainly can-
not act as a sharing of responsibility. What good can come of it?
It will add to the delay, expense 34 and cumbersomeness of the
procedural machinery, to say nothing of the possibilities of dis-
satisfaction, with no apparent compensating advantages at all.
This procedure has not been found necessary or advisable with
respect to carriers now subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.
Joint hearings and cooperation with state commissions and of-
ficials, when desirable, can furnish all the advantages of local
knowledge and representation, without the disadvantages inhe-
rent in joint boards. 5
It is provided in the bill that no common carrier of persons may
operate in interstate or foreign commerce on any highway with-
out a certificate of public convenience and necessity." Suitable
protection is afforded those already in bona fide operation.
The bill is not always wholly consistent. After solemnly stat-
ing that:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as a declara-
tion by Congress of the relative importance to the public of the
several kinds of transportation.
'37
it provides that:
" . . . . the commission shall, so far as is consistent with the
public interest, preserve competition in service." 38
and apparently to that end:
331t is contained also in H. R. 12229, introduced by Representative
Stewart. See post note 75.34The net saving to the commission by reason of the fact that the
salaries of the members of the joint boards are to be paid by the states
would be small.
35The commission is authorized to hold joint hearings with state coin-
missions and authorities. Sec. 3(g).386The certificate must "specify the routes over which, and/or the
fixed termini between which, the carrier is authorized to operate." Certain
reasonable conditions, including those providing for additional service, shall
be attached to the certificate. Sec. 6(a). The carrier may occasionally
deviate from its route to provide special service, subject to such regula-
tions as the commission may prescribe. Sec. 6(b).37Sec. 5(c).
38Sec. 5(e).
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"If ... there is no adequate service by a common carrier of per-
sons by motor vehicle ... the absence of such adequate service shall
be sufficient evidence that the public convenience and necessity [re-
quire motor vehicle service] ; and a certificate shall be issued ac-
cordingly if the applicant is found to be qualified. . ... :,9
It is difficult to see how this is not a declaration of preference.
Adequate existing service would justify the commission in refus-
ing a certificate to a rail carrier.4
No common carrier of property or charter carrier is to be al-
lowed to operate without a permit.,1 the only prerequisite to secur-
ing which is a showing "that the applicant is fit and able properly
to perform the service proposed."*"- The commission is given
authority to prescribe "reasonable limitations in respect to service
while operating over any regular route of a common carrier by
motor vehicle." The important matter of rates is left untouched.
Charter carriers thus seem to be free to engage in cut-throat com-
petition with all common carriers of persons. There is one sav-
ing provision, however. Certificates and permits may be sus-
pended, changed or revoked for failure to comply with the Act,
or with lawful orders of the commission "or whenever the public
interest shall so require."' ' 3 Perhaps the latter provision might be
construed to give the commission some power of check against
harmful practices by common carriers of property and charter
carriers, but it is clearly inadequate.
The matter of consolidations and mergers involving a common
carrier by motor vehicle is strictly regulated under the supervision
of the commission. When permitted, relief is granted from the
antitrust laws. Charter carriers are not included."' Railroad cor-
porations may organize and operate motor carriers where no con-
solidation or merger of motor carriers is involved.,"
3 9 Sec. 5(f).40See Sec. 1(18) (19) (20) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
41Sec. 7(a).
4"Sec. 7(b).
43Sec. 8 (a).
44Consolidations and/or mergers of two or more carriers, one or more
of which is a common carrier by motor vehicle. are prohibited unless
authorized by the commission. Those which involve the union of two or
more railroads or the acquisition of control of one railroad by another are
prohibited absolutely; and the same is true "if one or more of the corpora-
tions involved is engaged, directly or indirectly, in the transportation of
persons by railroad." Sec. 9.
45"Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to prevent railroad
corporations from organizing or operating motor carriers where no con-
solidation or merger of motor carriers is involved in such organization or
operation." Sec. 9(c).
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Security for the protection of the public is provided for, in the
case of all carriers subject to the Act, through the filing of surety
bonds or policies of insurance." Such a provision is urgenltly
needed in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sprout v.
City of South Bend, Ind.,47 denying the states the right to require
interstate carriers to provide for the protection of interstate pas-
sengers and property.
The tariffs of common carriers of persons must be filed with
the commission and observed strictly.' Rates, fares and charges
must be just and reasonable, but:
"No such rate, fare, or charge shall be held to be unjust or
unreasonable by the commission or by any joint board, under this
Act, on the ground that it is unjust to a competing carrier engaged
in a different kind of transportation."'' 9
In valuations for rate-making purposes good will, earning power,
going value, and the certificate under which the carrier is operat-
ing are not to be considered, and in applying for a certificate the
carrier is deemed to have agreed to this provision."0
A lamentable fact is that outside of the matter of financial
responsibility and safety practically no control whatever is given
the commission over common carriers of property or charter car-
riers.
This bill specifically states that it is not to be construed as at-
tempting to interfere with the powers of taxation of the states, with
their powers over intrastate commerce, or with laws enacted by
the states relating to the maintenance, protection, safety or use of
the highways therein, if applicable alike to intrastate and inter-
state commerce. 5
Two amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act dealing with
the matter of control are appended.'5
46Recovery is not limited to the amount of the policy or bond, and no
United States district court shall have jurisdiction on the ground of di-
versity of citizenship, or that a federal law is involved. Sec. 10.
47(1928) 277 U. S. 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L. R. 45.
48Scc. 11(a). No changes may be made in such tariffs except after
thirty days' notice, unless a shorter period is approved by the commission.
Sec. 11(c). See Sec. 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act.49 Sec. 11 (d).
5°Sec. 11(e).
5"Sec. 14(a).
5-The bill also proposes to amend paragraph (2) of section 5 of the
Interstate Commerce Act in great detail. A most elaborate and compre-
hensive scheme is provided to prevent a carrier, or a person controlling a
carrier, from obtaining control of another carrier, either directly, or indi-
rectly, in any conceivable manner, whatsoever, without the authority of the
commission, which, of course, must find that the consolidation is in the
public interest. But it is specifically provided "That nothing herein shall
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The bill is now before the committee. It will likely show some
changes when next reported.
H. R. 7239. A bill53 applicable to common carriers"' of persons
and of property alike was introduced in the House by Representa-
tive Huddleston on January 8, 1932. All authority is vested in
the commission, which is given power over service, rates, accounts,
qualifications of employees, safety, and equipment.""
The procedure in handling complaints is substantially the same
as under the Interstate Commerce Act 6 and the same is true of
court review.1
7
Security for the protection of the public is provided by requir-
ing the filing and approval of "surety bonds, policies of insurance.
or other securities or agreements." ' s  A "certificate of approval"
is to be issued by the commission, a copy of which must be posted
in each motor vehicle. The protection is evidently intended for
the benefit of passengers, shippers, and the general public.
be construed to prevent railroad corporations from organizing or operatingi
motor carriers .... where no consolidation, merger, or acquisition of
control of such motor carriers is involved in such organization or operation."
The carriers covered by the section as amended are all those subject to the
Interstate Commerce Act, now or hereafter, and common carriers by motor
vehicle subject to the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 1932.
The bill also provides for the amendment of paragraph (8) of section
5 of the Interstate Commerce Act to grant relief from the provisions of
the antitrust laws in cases in which the commission has permitted consoli-
dation or merger.
53H. R. 7239, 72d Congress, 1st Session. On December 14. 1931, Rep-
resentative Bacon introduced H. R. 5596, a bill "To provide for the regu-
lation of common carriers by motor vehicle in the same manner as common
carriers by railroad," by subjecting them to all applicable provisions of
the Interstate Commerce Act.
On June 9, 1932, Representative Arnold introduced H. R. 12541 (72d
Congress, 1st Session) "To place carriers by motor-propelled vehicles for
compensation in interstate commerce under the jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission" and subject to the Interstate Commerce Act
so far as its provisions might be applicable.
Such bills would lead to endless confusion.54
"The term 'common carrier by motor vehicle' means any common
carrier of persons or property operating motor vehicles for compensation
in interstate or foreign commerce over fixed routes or between fixed termini.
Sec. 1(a) (8).
School busses and hotel busses are excluded. Sec. l(b).
55To .... establish reasonable requirements with respect to continu-
ous and adequate service at just and reasonable rates, a uniform system of
accounts and reports, qualifications and maximum hours of service of em-
ployees, safety of operation and equipment, comfort of passengers, and
pick-up and delivery points whether on regular routes or within defined lo-
calities or districts." Sec. 2(a).56Sec. 3.57Sec. 3(f). Appropriate provision is made for serving orders, notices.
and making service of process; for fines, and for judicial redress. Sees. 7
and 8.
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The provisions with respect to rates, fares, and charges are
similar to those found in the Interstate Commerce Act." But no
rate, fare, or charge shall be held to be unjust or unreasonable
on the ground that it is unjust to a competing carrier, and
the commission is specifically denied the power to increase
or to fix a rate, fare, or charge. 0  The door is thus left
open to all manner of cut-throat competition between carriers, and
to the abuses which it was found could not be eliminated in the case
of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act except by
giving to the commission the power to establish minimum as well
as maximum rates.
The valuation provisions"' are substantially the same as in the
Senate bill,"2 while those pertaining to consolidations and mergers-
are practically the same as in H. R. 12229.' 1 The police power
and the taxing power of the states are specifically reserved.00 This
bill was referred to the committee, where it will likely remain.
. Interstate Connmerce Commission Report. Congress having
taken no action as a result of the report of the commission in
Docket No. 18300, Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation," the
commission instituted an investigation on its own motion into the
coordination of motor transportation with that of carriers now
subject to its jurisdiction. 67 A most extensive and intensive study
of the problem was made. The report proposed by Attorney-Ex-
aminer Leo J. Flynn 8 was issued January 6, 1932. The final re-
port of the commission 9 was issued April 6, 1932. The havoc
which has been wrought by having one system of transportation
bound in an antiquated legislative strait-jacket, while its com-
58Sec. 5.
59Tariffs must be filed with the commission and be strictly adhered to,
and no changes shall be made except on thirty days' notice, unless permit-
ted by the commission. Sec. 6(a) (b).
6OSec. 6(d).
O'Sec. 6(e).
(2Supra note 25.
63Sec. 4(a) (b).64See post note 75.65Sec. 9(a).
66(1928) 140 I. C. C. 685.
67Order of May 12, 1930, in Docket No. 23400, Coordination of Motor
Tran.sportation.
6SThe proposed report circulated by the commission is mimeographed,
but it has also been printed as Senate Document No. 43. 72d Congress. 1st
Session. Mr. Flynn also wrote the proposed report in Docket No. 18300.
See supra note 9.
69Coordination of Motor Transportation, (1932) 182 I. C. C. 263.
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petitor is practically free from all restraint, is lucidly set forth in
the reports.70 The need for intelligent coordination of railroad
and highway transportation is dearly shown. To achieve the de-
sired results both forms of transportation must be placed under
appropriate regulation.
Broadly, the recommendations of the original report are re-
peated with respect to carriers of passengers" but with the orig-
inal jurisdiction in the commission instead of in state boards, or
commissions. Joint boards, however, are recommended.
The commission recommends putting regulation of motor busses
to the test right now,72 and requiring such permits and reports
from common carrier and charter carrier trucks as will make it
possible to secure information on which to base recommendations
for more comprehensive regulation. Through routes and joint
rates with rail and water carriers should be permitted, but not re-
quired, in the case of both trucks and busses. 2 It is recommended
that all police regulations for the present be left to the states."
Since the issuance of the final report two major bills have been
introduced in the House. They are discussed below.
H. R. 12229. Representative Stewart introduced a bill- on
May 21, 1932, modeled along the lines of the Senate bill7 ex-
cept that it places common carriers of persons and of property in
the same class.
Charter carriers must file tariffs with the commission showing
minimum rates for line haul of persons and property, and the
commission is given power to prescribe systems of accounts and
reports77 and minimum rates" for such carriers. The commission
is given power to fix both maximum and minimum rates of com-
mon carriers. 9 The issuance of interstate license tags is pro-
70To obtain an adequate appreciation of the situation both the proposed
report and the final report must be read.
71(1928) 140 I. C. C. 685.
72(1932) 182 I. C. C. 263, 384.
73(1932) 182 I. C. C. 263, 387.
74(1932) 182 I. C. C. 263, 387.
75H. R. 12229, 72d Congress, 1st Session.
76Supra note 25.77Sec. 2 (a) (2).
7sSec. 12(d).
79 1t is further provided: "The rates, fares, charges, regulations, and
practices of such [apparently all] carriers shall be just and reasonable and
free from unjust discrimination, undue preference or undue prejudice
Sec. 11.
The giving or receiving of rebates is prohibited, and specific penalties
are provided for violations of the act. Sec. 14.
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vided for.80  The desirability, if not necessity, of this requirement
seems obvious.
In other respects than those outlined above the bill resembles
the Senate bill,8 ' except that the proposed amendments to the In-
terstate Commerce Act are omitted.82  It is the soundest bill yet
introduced.
H. R. 12739. Representative Rayburn, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, introduced the "offi-
cial" bill of the committee in the House on June 21, 1932.8s  It is
patterned broadly after the Senate bill."' Carriers are diviled
into two classes only: "common carrier by motor vehicle"''8 and
"private carrier by motor vehicle."80
The matters of consolidations, mergers, acquisitions of control, "
rates and tariffs88 are gone into more in detail than in the Senate
bill. Specific provision is made for the inspection of facilities and
records of carriers subject to the act."
The provisions in the Senate bill that absence of motor carrier
service shall be sufficient showing of public convenience and ne-
80Sec. 7(c).8t Supra note 25. The provisions with respect to consolidation and
merger in S. 2793 are amplified to include "any acquisition of control."
Sec. 9.8 2 See supra note 52.
83H. R. 12739, 72d Congress, 1st Session.8 4See supra note 25.
85
"The term 'common carrier by motor vehicle' includes any carrier of
passengers or property by motor vehicle for compensation in interstate or
foreign commerce which undertakes or offers to transport passengers or
property for the general public." Sec. 1(a)(ll).
86"The term 'private carrier by motor vehicle' means any carrier by
motor vehicle regularly engaged in the business of transporting passengers
or property for compensation in interstate or foreign commerce under a
contract, agreement, or arrangement, and which does not undertake or offer
to transport passengers or property for the general public : Provided. That
this shall not include a casual or verbal contract for the carrying of ten
persons or less on a single trip." Sec. 1(a) (12).
8 7Sec. 9. Within certain limits they are encouraged.
"
5Provision is made for joint passenger tariffs with other motor car-
riers and with carriers by rail and by water. All of these provision,; are
also made applicable to joint rates by motor common carriers of property
in conjunction with rail and water carriers and to through transportatih n by
a rail or a water carrier when part of the haul is by motor carrier. Sec, 11.
Rates of passenger carriers must be "just and reasonable and free fronti
unjust discrimination. undue preference, or undue prejudice." Sec. 12.
"Common carriers of passengers by motor vehicle may establish with
other such carriers, and common carriers of passengers or property by
motor vehicle may establish with carriers by railroad or by water" through
routes and joint rates. The commission is given power to establish both
maximum and minimum rates for such transportation. Sec. 12.
89Sec. 13.
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cessity to authorize the issuance of a certificate. ' and that in tort
actions diversity of citizenship shall not give federal jurisdiction, " '
and also the sections amending certain parts of the Interstate Com-
merce Act, 2 are left out.
In other respects the bill broadly follows the Senate bill. It is
now before the committee.
COMMENT
While the quality of the bills introduced at each succeeding ses-
sion of Congress has been progressively better, Congress has care-
fully refrained from permitting any of the benefits to get through
to the public. No one can read the proposed report of Attorney-
Examiner Flynn and the final report of the commission in Docket
No. 23400 without feeling that the failure of Congress to act is
little short of calamitous. It is true no one of the bills has been
perfect. Experience will show changes necessary in any one of
them. But that experience can never be gained until a start is
made.
The chance of any other than the official committee bill being
passed by either house of Congress is very small. This narrows
the proposed legislation capable of being enacted to two bills, the
Senate bill, S. 2793, and the House bill, H. R. 12739. It is likely
that the Senate bill when next reported by the committee will re-
semble the House bill.
The commission has recommended putting regulation of com-
mon carriers of persons to the test now, and of requiring reports
-from common carriers of property and charter carriers that will
enable it to study-the problem further with the thought of recon-
mending regulatory legislation later on. This of course will mean
several more years of irresponsible cut-throat competition and
practices on the part of carriers of property. Congress should
obviously proceed cautiously, but if present dilatory tactics are
permitted to continue the day of effective regulation of motor car-
riers of property is far off. And naturally the transportation situ-
ation will become worse.
The bill introduced by Representative Stewart" placing com-
mon carriers of persons and of property under the same regula-
tions and providing effective control of charter carriers is needed
90See supra note 39.
91See S. 2793, Sec. 10(c)-supra notes 25 and 46.
92See supra note 52.93Supra note 75.
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now. Broad discretionary power should naturally be left to the
commission in order to avoid any harsh or unwise action and to
permit the growth and development of all transportation agencies
on a sound economic basis. This cannot take place while rail
and water carriers are bound in an antiquated legislative strait-
jacket and motor carriers are free from all restraint.
If conditions continue to get worse, and they are bound to in
the absence of intelligent regulation, there may be a reaction which
will result in drastic regulation not only detrimental to the re-
sponsible motor vehicle operators but to the public as well. Each
succeeding bill introduced in Congress has been more exacting
than its predecessors. This simply means that the longer regula-
tion is delayed the more difficult the matter of adjustment will be.
In a word, the tree should be trained in the direction in which
it will be permitted to live, and not be allowed to grow in a direc-
tion which will necessitate cutting off major branches after it is
grown. Thus far the motor vehicle operators have not been able
to realize this.
The beginning of intelligent regulation by Congress is long
past due.
